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Abstract
On 3 March 2017, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies (RSCAS) and Assonime (Association of Italian Joint Stock 
Companies) jointly organised a workshop at the European University 
Institute (EUI) in Florence. The workshop focussed on the role of EU 
competition policy in e-commerce, in the light of the recent European 
Commission Sector Inquiry relating to this field. 
The event was opened with a keynote speech delivered by Cecilio 
Madero Villarejo, Deputy Director General for Antitrust of the 
DG Competition of the European Commission. The workshop was 
divided into three panels, which dealt respectively with (i) economic 
insights from the EU Commission Sector Inquiry in relation to the 
e-commerce of goods; ii) the enforcement approach followed by 
National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in e-commerce; and iii) 
e-commerce in digital content. 
The event gathered together different stakeholders, including 
representatives from NCAs, academia, industry, law firms and 
economic consultancies. The diversity of views ensured a lively 
debate. This Policy Brief summarises the main points raised during 
the discussion and seeks to stimulate further debate.
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Background: EU Commission Sector 
Inquiry in relation to e-commerce
In May 2015, the DG Competition of the European 
Commission launched a Sector Inquiry in relation to 
e-commerce as part of the Digital Single Market (DSM) 
strategy. In September 2016, DG Competition published 
the Preliminary Report resulting from its Sector Inquiry.1 
In particular, the Preliminary Report focussed on the 
online sale of goods and digital content. The European 
Commission is expected to publish the Final Report on 
the Sector Inquiry in the course of 2017.
During the Sector Inquiry, the EU Commission collected 
information from over 1800 companies, including 
manufacturers, retailers and copyright owners of digital 
content. In addition, the EU Commission scrutinized 
over 8000 distribution agreements that included clauses 
affecting e-commerce of goods and digital contents. 
Finally, 65 firms participated in the public consultation 
that followed the publication of the Preliminary Report 
in Autumn 2016. The Sector Inquiry thus provided the 
EU Commission with an overview of the competition 
dynamics in the e-commerce industry in Europe.
The Preliminary Report pointed out that e-commerce 
enhances online price transparency thus strenghtening 
price competition and increasing the consumers’ choice. 
In particular, consumers can easily compare products 
and prices via price comparison tools, decreasing their 
search costs and allowing consumers to switch from one 
retailer to another. Nevertheless, the Preliminary Report 
also identified a number of trends that may raise anti-
competitive concerns. First of all, the Preliminary Report 
pointed out that most retailers track online prices of 
their competitors and a majority of them use automatic 
software programmes to adjust their prices in view of 
those of competitors. In particular:
1. 53% track online prices of their competitors;
2. 67% of retailers use automatic software for that 
purpose;
3. 78% of retailers use software to track prices and to 
adjust their own prices to those of their competitors;
1.  The Preliminary Report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries_e_commerce.html (last 
visited 23.3.2017).
Secondly, manufacturers have adopted a number of 
practices in order to better control the online distribution 
of their products and to reinforce competition on other 
parameters rather than prices, such as brand image 
and quality. In fact, while retailers compete primarily 
on price, manufactures compete mainly on quality and 
brand image.
The Preliminary Report identified three main reactions 
by the manufacturers vis a vis the growing e-commerce:
1. Selective distribution systems in which the products 
can only be sold by pre-selected authorized sellers 
are used more widely;
2. Manufacturers increasingly sell their products online 
directly to consumers, thereby directly competing 
with their own retailers;
3. Manufacturers resort to vertical restraints.
Among the typical restraints affecting e-commerce 
that manufacturers include in vertical agreements the 
Preliminary Report pointed out that:
1. 42% of the retailers face some form of price 
recommendation or price restriction from 
manufacturers; while pure recommendations are 
not illegal, some of them amount to Resale Price 
Maintenance (RPM);
2. 18% of the retailers are contractually restricted from 
selling on online marketplaces (i.e. platform bans); 
3. 9% of the retailers are contractually restricted from 
submitting offers to price comparison websites;
4. 11% of the retailers have reported to the EU 
Commission that their suppliers impose contractual 
restrictions on cross-border sales.
These types of contractual sales restrictions may, under 
certain circumstances, make online shopping more 
difficult and ultimately harm consumers, by preventing 
them from benefiting from greater choice and lower prices 
offered by e-commerce. On the other hand, in relation 
to the widely debated platform bans, the preliminary 
findings of the European Commission call for a nuanced 
approach which does not warrant a general prohibition 
of such bans (i.e. no hardcore restriction), but rather a 
case-by-case approach based on the effects of individual 
restrictions. 
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In relation to the e-commerce of digital contents, the 
Preliminary Report pointed out that one of the key 
determinants of competition in digital content markets 
is the availability of licences. The availability of rights for 
online transmission is largely determined by the scope 
of rights, as defined in the licensing agreements between 
right holders and digital content providers. The European 
Commission will therefore need to assess whether certain 
licensing practices in digital content markets restrict 
competition, taking into account the legal and economic 
context and the characteristics of the specific product 
and geographic markets, and whether competition law 
enforcement is necessary in order to ensure effective 
competition.
E-commerce in goods: economic insights 
from the Sector Inquiry
The economists participating in the first panel of the 
workshop pointed out that the competitive problems 
identified by the EU Commission in the context of the 
Sector Inquiry are well-known issues in the economics 
of vertical restraints. In particular, clauses in vertical 
agreements that limit the ability of the distributor to sell 
goods online/ or to set the price may generate foreclosure 
concerns and favour the cartelisation at the downstream 
level. On the other hand, such clauses may also have pro-
competitive effects and be justified for legitimate reasons. 
For instance, geo-blocking allows price discrimination 
among different customers who are based in different 
countries. Such discrimination may reflect the differences 
in demand conditions in different EU member states, 
based on the consumers’ purchasing power. Price 
discrimination caused by geo-blocking may therefore 
increase consumers’ welfare, rather than harming it.
Besides their ambiguous welfare effect, vertical 
restraints in e-commerce may be justified for reasons 
of  ‘incomplete contracting’: selected retailers provide to 
the final consumers a number of additional services that 
are not originally included in the distribution agreement 
with the manufacturer (e.g., presenting the product to 
the final consumers; assisting consumers in the case 
of the repair of the product). By limiting intra-brand 
competition, vertical restraints safeguard the incentive 
of the distributor to provide such additional services, 
for which the retailer does not receive an express 
remuneration from the manufacturer. In the context of 
e-commerce, vertical restraints may safeguard bricks and 
mortar shops that usually provide such additional services 
to final consumers; the latter would otherwise disappear 
due to the free-riding enjoyed by online retailers. 
Besides the prevention of free riding and remuneration 
for incomplete contracting, vertical restraints are 
required to safeguard the brand image of the product. In 
the context of online commerce, in fact, the traditional 
trademark protection is not sufficient to safeguard the 
brand image: firms rely on specific colours, designs 
and product presentations that allow the consumers to 
identify the brand. , but such details are easy to replicate 
by others in online sales channels. In other words, it is 
easy to affect brand image if online channels are not 
used properly. Manufacturers are keen to ensure that 
the brand is presented in the same manner in both 
bricks and mortar shops and in online marketplaces. As 
a consequence, manufacturers usually impose clauses 
in vertical distribution agreements that limit the ability 
of retailers to sell the goods on web-sites that do not 
safeguard the appropriate brand image.
Another quite diffuse vertical restraint, which is linked 
to the brand and/or the trademark’s exploitation and 
safeguarding, concerns the restriction on retailers to bid 
for the trademarks of certain manufacturers in order to 
get a preferential listing by the search engines of paid 
referencing services. In this type of auction market, the 
supplier usually has strong market power, while there 
is fierce competition on the demand side, often with 
inefficient outcomes. Precluding preferential listing is 
a discriminatory behaviour that directly affects traffic 
and sales and raises rivals’ costs. The challenge here 
is to evaluate whether the restraint can be justified for 
trademark protection reasons, or for other plausible 
economic justifications, otherwise it may be considered 
as a by-object restriction.  
The participants agreed that the increasing reliance 
by manufacturers on vertical restraints in selective 
distribution agreements represents a reaction to the 
growth of e-commerce. In particular, due to the potential 
efficiencies and legitimate reasons mentioned above, 
vertical restraints in e-commerce should be subject to 
case-by-case analysis, rather than being considered to 
be hard-core violations. This is the case, in particular, 
for vertical restraints that have recently emerged in the 
e-commerce world and which did not previously exist in 
traditional selective distribution agreements (e.g., a ban 
on the online marketplace and price comparison web-
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The Adidas and Cite cases2 were mentioned as examples 
of this uncertainty. 
It was suggested that, given the difference in approach 
across the EU, an analysis of the economic impact of both 
the use of the contested practice and its total prohibition 
could help to provide guidance on future action. In 
particular, the effects should be considered EU-wide, 
rather than in each country. Moreover, these effects are 
quite different for big companies and for SMEs, and this is 
not only a German phenomenon. This being the scenario, 
participants wondered whether, and how, the NCA’s 
intervention changes it. In other words, they wondered 
about the counter-factual, which so far does not appear 
to have been taken into due consideration. Perhaps, a 
generalised intervention could help bring prices down 
at an EU level. There was nevertheless a consensus on 
the fact that, while reasoning about prohibiting clauses, 
the economic and business reasons for such differences 
should be taken into account, together with the legal 
ones.  
Recently, the line between price recommendation 
and minimum price fixing has been difficult to draw. 
Frequently, price recommendation mechanisms imply 
the use of software and algorithms, and this may affect 
the assessment of conduct. Here, some Member States, 
like Germany, are using a strict approach: in the CIBA 
case3, for instance, the German NCA concluded that the 
mechanisms for systematically monitoring competitors’ 
prices would lead to an infringement of the competition 
rules. In this respect, participants debated on the concept 
of interdependent action, its boundaries and its role in 
the assessment of the conducts at stake, all elements 
that have so far neither been clarified by the European 
Commission, nor by the NCAs. 
Uncertainties and unresolved issues are not new in the 
field of vertical restraints; but in the online dimension 
their impact is wider. In more general terms, there was 
consensus around the fact that a better understanding of 
vertical restraints, and not just of specific clauses, could 
be useful in assessing when and how to intervene. In 
particular, participants expressed the need for a greater 
understanding of the likelihood, size and nature of free-
2.  http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/
E N/ P r e s s e m i t t e i l u n g e n / 2 014 / 0 2 _ 0 7_ 2 014 _ a d i d a s .
html?nn=3591568 (last access 3.4.2017).
3.  http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/
Pressemitteilungen/2009/25_09_2009_Ciba-Vision.
sites). In addition, in the context of e-commerce, the 
European Commission should re-consider the traditional 
per se approach that is followed in relation to a number of 
vertical restraints (e.g., RPM and restrictions on passive 
sales), where a number of reasons call for a case-by-case, 
rather than a per se, analysis.
The enforcement approach followed by 
National Competition Authorities
While opening this session, it was noted that there are 
major differences across Member States in relation to 
the assessment under Article 101 TFEU of many of the 
critical clauses that are typical of the e-commerce sector 
and that restrict competition, and also in relation to the 
enforcement strategies followed by NCAs. On the one 
hand, Regulation 1/2003 calls for rules to be applied 
uniformly by national enforcers; however, the Sector 
Inquiry shows the opposite in the e-commerce sector. 
Regulation 1/2003 also sets the grounds for coordinated 
enforcement by means of the European Competition 
Network. Again, this does not appear to be the case in 
the sector being investigated. Finally, Regulation 1/2003 
gives the European Commission the role of focussing on 
the major cases, and the cross-countries ones; nor, here, 
has the Sector Inquiry confirmed this circumstance. 
Concerning geo-blocking, so far, very little enforcement 
has taken place at the national level, while the European 
Commission is currently running two investigations. 
Participants noted that one of the reasons may be that 
geo-blocking has a fundamental role to play in the full 
deployment of the Digital Single Market (DSM), and thus 
this may not be an issue with which the NCAs should 
deal. 
MFNs clauses, on the contrary, show a more uncertain 
state in the law. In this field, NCAs have been quite active, 
especially with regard to “narrow” clauses. However, 
if, on the one hand, this experiment leads to mutual 
learning and allows for a better observation of the effects 
of different approaches, on the other, doubts were cast 
concerning the outcomes, in terms of legal certainty.
Another point in which the EU competition law appears 
to be quite uncertain is the ban on platforms, which is 
subject to different guidelines in various Member States, 
and to different use by the national business communities. 
It remains unclear whether the VBER applies, or whether 
the ban has to be considered to be a hard core restriction. 
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riding, in order to establish under what circumstances 
the latter can justify vertical restraints.
To conclude, it was stressed that, currently, there is 
relatively little coordination of public enforcement. 
Rather, NCAs seem to compete. On the other side, 
though, it was pointed out that the European Commission 
seems to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach; and participants 
wondered about the effectiveness of this choice, because 
the sector is fast moving, and therefore the lack of timely 
intervention may be difficult for businesses to manage. 
While discussing enforcement strategies, it was suggested 
that NCAs should concentrate on the facts and try to show 
evidence of any reduction in economic welfare, which is 
what matters to the consumers. Another strategy could 
be to go beyond simple command and control; in fact, 
infringement decisions are not the only tool at the NCAs’ 
disposal. Commitments can also be used, although they 
usually result in limited judicial review and have little 
value in relation to precedent. Attendees argued that it 
might be more efficient to better explain, in a prohibition 
decision, how the relevant rules should be interpreted 
and applied. Overall, the NCA’s legitimacy would be 
enhanced by the latter’s clarity. 
Additionally, the adoption of positive decisions should 
be taken into due consideration, as well as the possibility 
of providing better guidance through sector inquiries or 
guidelines. Finally, the possibility to build a profitable 
dialogue with the business community should not be 
excluded, in order to better understand the market and 
business dynamics in a very fast-changing environment. 
In the light of the latter, a regular ex post review of positive 
and negative decisions could bring many advantages. 
It was also noted that, so far, NCAs have rarely used 
consumer protection tools in the e-commerce sector, 
but they might consider doing so. However, the risks of 
creating disparities in the level of protection, grounded on 
the disparities of the NCAs’ powers relative to consumer 
protection in the different Member States, should also be 
carefully considered when reflecting on this option. 
As for the tasks being shared between the Commission 
and the NCAs, attendees raised a number of points, both 
to favour the former over the latter, and vice-versa. On the 
one hand, the European Commission should move first, 
because it can pick the best cases; it can issue positive 
decisions; it can create precedents to follow. On the other 
hand, the NCAs should act first in order to allow for 
experiment, which, in turn, creates the conditions for 
mutual learning; moreover, NCAs might take into due 
account the economic differences among the national 
markets; finally, NCAs can also adopt cross-jurisdictional 
decisions, although they appear extremely reluctant to 
do so. This is a key point, since e-commerce cases can 
easily show cross-border effects, as, for example, when 
the incriminated clause damages the consumers of other 
countries, and this is a de facto novelty (with which NCAs 
have to cope. In this context, the role of the European 
Competition Network (ECN) was also discussed: while 
some of the participants held the view that Network had 
played a limited role in the OTAs case, others emphasized 
that thanks to ECN an acceptable level of coordination 
had been achieved, ensuring a convergent outcome in the 
majority of the EU member states.
The debate was enriched by the discussion of national 
experiences. Amongst others, it was noted that the 
Bundeskartellamt seems to act as a leader, and seemed 
to have an approach that is strongly oriented towards 
consumer protection. The CMA also appears to be very 
active and inclined to experiment, as it uses different 
tools to achieve results; moreover, its assessment is made 
on a case-by-case basis, rather than on per se rules. The 
AGCM, on its part, seems to combine enforcement and 
advocacy4 and to consider consumers’ empowerment 
to be an effective solution. One might argue, though, 
that this solution is extremely sensitive to the level of 
consumers’ awareness and e-literacy. 
E-commerce in digital content 
The last panel of the day concentrated on two main issues, 
both identified as areas for action, including legislative 
action, by the European Commission: unjustified geo-
blocking, and the need to modernise copyright rules.
When dealing with digital content, the key determinant 
of competition is the availability of licenses from the 
holders of copyrights. However, contractual restrictions 
have become the norm, and many of them grant 
exclusivity, even those contractual restrictions that are 
long term (20+ years). On the other hand, geo-blocking 
is sometimes realised without the use of contractual 
clauses, but, rather, by means of unilateral decisions. 
Although exclusivity and geo-blocking are not used with 
4.  See Uber and taxi drivers or Airbnb
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the same frequencies in all Member States, they create 
many concerns in terms of market partitioning and 
barriers to entry. 
In general terms, participants recalled that freedom to 
choose one’s trading partner remains the basic principle, 
and that restrictions are allowed under national copyright 
rules. We should thus be out of the scope of per se rules, 
and we need to apply a case-by-case approach. 
One element to take into account is that, when it comes 
to digital content, there is a potential friction between 
the DSM objective and copyright rules, because the 
latter grant exclusivity on a territorial basis and allow 
for the use of territorial licenses. Participants noted 
that, currently, there is a strong political will towards 
the realisation of the DSM, and this may have a deep 
impact on where the balance between free movement 
of services and competition law principles, on the one 
hand, and the protection of IPRs, on the other, should 
be struck. Some also wondered about the risks of over-
enforcement. Finally, the comparison was made with the 
recent EU experience in relation to roaming charges for 
mobile calls. 
Furthermore, it was noted that audio-visual markets are 
still national in scope because of cultural differences. 
According to the EU rules, exclusive territorial 
restrictions are permitted, while absolute restrictions 
are not. The key point here is thus where the line should 
be drawn between passive and active sales in the online 
world. It was mentioned that, while doing this, the 
European Commission might change the behaviour of 
an entire industry. 
When dealing with restrictions related to the distribution 
and sales of digital content, the uneasy relationship 
between competition and IP rules comes into play. 
Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU, Article 20(2) of the Service 
Directive (which prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
nationality or place of residence) and the VBER, are all 
applicable, depending on the circumstances. However, 
where the restriction falls within the ‘specific subject 
matter’ of the IP right, if it is considered reasonable and 
proportionate, then it is permitted under sector specific 
rules.  
Among the sector specific rules, the principle of 
exhaustion was mentioned, which aims to mitigate the 
principle of territoriality and to stimulate cross-border 
exploitation of copyrighted content. The key point is 
that exhaustion does not arise in the case of online 
services5. Territorial licensing of intangible copyrighted 
works and services is thus lawful, and parallel imports 
can be prevented by relying on the territoriality of 
copyright. As there are no borders on the Internet, the 
only way to establish territoriality for digital content is 
through geo-blocking, which the European Commission 
has recently declared a restriction by object in the Sky-UK 
case.6 However, the case was criticised, suggesting that 
the Commission’s analysis of market definition, market 
power and the justifications put forward by the parties 
was not sufficiently performed. 
In addition, participants raised the point that, due to the 
importance of the sunk costs and the short life of products 
in both the music and the audio-visual industries, the 
possibility to discriminate between Member States 
through prices can be essential to ensure the viability of 
business models and to preserve the dynamic incentives 
to invest in the production of creative content. In other 
words, price discrimination can increase welfare. When 
geo-blocking supports this price discrimination, it 
may thus be looked at in a different way, and not as a 
restriction by object. 
On the contrary, it might even be argued that, in these 
specific cases, to pursue the DSM objective by prohibiting 
any form of price discrimination could actually damage 
consumer welfare. To conclude, there appeared to be 
consensus around the need to look with more attention 
at the concrete effects of single discrimination, which 
are difficult to assess ex-ante, rather than adopting a by 
object approach. 
It was noted that, so far, the European Commission 
has given almost no guidance about how to deal with 
the issues mentioned above, while the EU Courts have. 
The principle laid down in Murphy7, according to which 
the protection of copyright should not be equated with 
exclusivity, and much less with territorial exclusivity, 
was recalled, and participants agreed that it is applicable 
beyond its own framework. Embracing the opposite view 
5.  Article 4, InfoSoc Directive.
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects 
of copyright and related rights in the information society. OJ 
L-167/10-19, 22.6.2001
6.  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5432_en.htm (last 
access 3.4.2017).
7.  Case C-403/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd and 
Others v QC Leisure and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:631. 
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would produce a result that is incompatible with the 
internal market aims and EU law by partitioning national 
markets. However, there was consensus on the need for 
very modern rules to fit the digital age. Extending the 
logic of the Murphy ruling to the online transmission 
of content is possible, in theory; however, participants 
wondered whether, in practice, this can happen without 
harmonising national copyright regimes, at least in 
order to extend the ‘country of origin’ principle to online 
transmission. 
A number of additional Court cases providing precious 
indications were recalled and debated. For instance, 
in Coditel the Court established that the exhaustion 
principle might articulate differently for broadcasting.8 
However, there was consensus that various issues still 
remain unsolved. By way of example, participants 
discussed the possibility of applying Article 101(3) on 
the basis of increasing incentives to invest in audio-visual 
content, or the encouragement of translations, and of 
other similar non-competition objectives. Furthermore, 
they also wondered whether, in light of the economic and 
legal context of the specific case, reverting to competition 
tools might not always be the best solution. 
In conclusion, the various on-going legislative initiatives 
were mentioned, and their respective capacity to deal 
with current challenges and frictions was debated. 
8.  Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant SA v Commune d’Uccle and 
Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, ECLI:EU:C:2008:621. 
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